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The hukou and traditional virtue: An ethnographic note on Taiwanese 
policing 
 
By Jeffrey T. Martin (Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong, China). 
 
Abstract.! This research note suggests that traditional ideals of virtue in Taiwan enable an 
order-making dynamic to operate in the backstage of state record-keeping processes. These 
virtues coordinate cooperation by policemen, civilians and politically empowered elites, 
simultaneously facilitating local order-maintenance and ensuring that police records serve the 
interests of the established political economic structure. I focus on the ways that this 
arrangement is grounded in the historical institution of the population registry, or hukou. I 
argue that Taiwan’s hukou has effectively translated traditional virtues into policeable objects 
of modern administration: inscribed in the documentary practices of population registration, 
embedded in a naturalized division of social control labor, and institutionalized as collective 
habits of response to trouble.!
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Introduction. 
 Contemporary policing institutions are a product of the historical process that 
constituted modern society as an object known through governing technologies like the 
“census, map and museum” (Anderson 1991; Scott 1999; Fraser this issue). This paper 
presents a case study of one of these technologies – the census or “hukou” – as it functions in 
Taiwan. Taiwan’s modern population registry was initially developed as a police technology 
by the Japanese colonial regime, and has remained the core of the island’s police organization 
ever since. Here, I use an ethnography of contemporary policing to show how the practical 
logic of this census-based policing system continues to embody an ideal of “particularistic 
virtue” associated with historically Chinese or East Asian political culture (Fei 1992, Otis and 
Lo 2003). This demonstrates one way in which a set of ostensibly Western modern 
institutions – census and police – can function as “fragmented pieces” embedded in the 
unfolding of a distinctively Asian history (Chen 2010). As a contribution to the larger 
ambition of this special-issue-project to develop an Asia-centric criminology, this article 
suggest how the history of modernity embodied in Taiwanese policing is driven by dynamics 
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internal to its local situation.  
 
2. Policed Society and Brokered Administration in Taiwan.  
 The skyline of the Taiwanese city where I began studying police was composed of 
buildings topped with an architecturally distinctive pastiche known as jiagai: extra stories, 
rooms, pigeon houses, and other functional appendages added surreptitiously after the official 
paperwork had been processed. Living in such illegal housing, as I did for several years, 
requires borrowing a legal address for purposes of hukou registration (the basis for one’s ID 
card, health insurance, voting rights, and other forms of official license), as well as for 
electric and water services, mail delivery, etc. Taiwanese society contains a multitude of civic 
organizations used to manage collective affairs: community development associations, 
building management committees, surname and native-place associations, chambers of 
commerce, etc. But the arrangements of registry sharing are made outside of such formal 
institutions. They extend along lines of intimate, particularistic or (in local idiom) 
ganqing/“sentiment”-based relations of kinship and friendship (cf. Fried 1953, Jacobs 1979). 
 My hukou registration was filed using the address of a friend’s legal apartment several 
blocks away. At one point, an awkward spell in relations with this friend resulted in my 
official (as it were) channel of communication with the state being cut off for a while. During 
this period, I had the strange experience of running into a mutual acquaintance of my census-
address friend, a woman I barely knew. Upon seeing me, she rummaged around in her purse 
and handed me a photograph of myself committing a traffic infraction, exhorting me to take 
care of this matter quickly, before the fines began to increase exponentially.  
 Traffic violations in Taiwan are often documented by hidden cameras, with the 
photograph and ticket being subsequently mailed to the census address at which the license 
plate is registered. Receiving a citation by purse is an outcome of the interface between the 
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formal anchor of the registry address and informal networks of neighborly concern. Thus, as 
a law enforcement event, the experience was revelatory of Taiwan’s “policing vernacular,” 
i.e. the distinctive mode of police practice emergent from a local history of modern 
government (Hornberger 2011). The shared accountability of a registry address served to 
integrate an ethos of neighborliness and friendship into the formal enforcement of legal 
penalties. The result was a hybrid disciplinary regime that effectively fused intimate 
compassion with bureaucratic surveillance. Such arrangements are perfectly suited to 
maintaining the baroque complexity of order in cities built around and beyond the limits of 
law. 
 Taiwan’s judicial architecture divides police into administrative and criminal 
branches, with emphasis on the former.
1
 The “front-line” of the police bureaucracy - its 
routine patrol and response capacity - is located in an administrative bureau called a 
paichusuo, a “dispatch post” or “substation.” This is the neighborhood police station, and 
thousands of substations are scattered across the island. Historically speaking, paichusuo are 
the oldest element of modern Taiwanese policing. Many have been in continuous operation 
since the Japanese colonial government first built them in the late nineteenth century. 
Throughout this period, their operations have been defined by the population register; each 
paichusuo functions to keep one territorially defined unit of the state’s records in order.
2
  
 I spent three years (2000-2003) doing ethnographic research in paichusuo in Taipei 
County. The substation where I spent most of my time was a three-story concrete building, 
the working facilities and residential barracks for 30 policemen. It was one of ten within its 
municipality, holding jurisdiction over a couple dozen city blocks with a population of about 
                                            
1
 Taiwan’s criminal justice system is inquisitorial, locating the agency of criminal prosecution in the Ministry of 
Justice rather than the Ministry of Interior (where the National Police Administration is located). There is a 
criminal detective division within the police force, but it is a specialized agency that does not maintain 
personnel in the neighborhood paichusuo.  
2
 The Japanese population registry was substantially different from the Chinese, see Ts’ai 2009. However the 
administrative architecture at the substation-level was structurally similar.  
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40,000. The census records for this population (still paper-based at that time) were held in the 
lockers of individual patrolmen. Each patrolman held the hukou records for their “beat,” a 
territorially defined group of a few thousand people. Conversely, each registered inhabitant 
of the city had an individual patrolman as designated contact in the police bureaucracy. The 
patrolman and his census subjects were, in a sense, jointly responsible for any audit of their 
hukou records conducted by superordinate bureaus. 
 The substation was near a bridge. Under the bridge, across the street from the 
substation, sat one of the city’s more spectacular embodiments of extralegal power: the 
headquarters of a taxi-driver’s union. The union was huge and powerful, with dozens of 
chapters under centralized leadership. It controlled lucrative taxi stands outside the hotels and 
brothels of Taipei’s red-light districts, and enjoyed a reputation for organized violence 
acquired during the political tumult of the early 1980s, when it served as a mobile strike force 
for the opposition movement prior to the end of martial law. The union headquarters was 
built of railroad-car-sized steel shipping containers, piled two-high for hundreds of meters 
along the river’s levee to create a walled compound. At night, when bonfires backlit the 
chapter flags flying from the walls, it looked much like a medieval castle. Inside those walls, 
it was rumored, union chapters ran casinos, brothels and unlicensed petrol stations. But the 
substation police claimed ignorance. They never entered the compound unless explicitly 
invited (such as to the banquets hosted there during election season). One night on patrol, for 
example, I accompanied a patrolman answering a 119 call anonymously reporting illegal 
gambling inside the compound (“Now that’s a patriotic citizen of the Republic of China … 
and a sore loser!” the policeman laughed upon receiving the call). We leisurely walked across 
the street and chatted with a doorman for a considerable period of time before being invited 
inside and shown an empty room as evidence that nothing untoward was going on. 
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 It was a conventional move in the division of social control labor. Businesses hire 
doormen to liaise with patrolmen responding to calls at their establishment. Indeed, the 
doorman and the patrolman are, in a sense, structurally analogous figures within the larger 
arrangements of the city’s overall political-economy. Both hold positions of subaltern 
authority under superiors tangled into the complexities of municipal politics. The escalation 
of disagreement in the street-level encounter between a patrolman and doorman invokes 
complicated networks of political patronage that both would rather leave undisturbed. From 
the policeman’s perspective, this particular call was especially straightforward because of its 
location. Formally speaking, the land occupied by the union’s compound was the site of a 
municipal renovation project scheduled for completion at an unspecified future date. The 
whole operation, in other words, rested on a property claim constituted by the political 
arrangements of (in local idiom) “closing one eye and opening the other.” It was effectively 
“off the books” at the highest levels. Because the union compound was an unregistered space, 
there was no accountability in the police station for what went on there. For the routines of 
Taiwanese administrative policing, registration is a necessary step in making things 
policeable. That which is unregistered is unpoliceable. Political powers, like those of the taxi-
driver’s union, use this to establish stable spaces of operation outside the policed order.  
 The situation is different when a registered hotel or private residence is used for 
gambling or prostitution. In that case, the policeman whose locker holds its registration is 
accountable for being the first to know and intervene. This arrangement underwrites a form 
of “brokered” administration
3
 with dynamics similar to those of my opening purse-borne-
citation example, i.e. coordinated efforts to keep things from getting out of hand are 
integrated through a fusion of bureaucratic surveillance with intimate concern. An 
                                            
3
 “[A]dministrative brokers facilitate the negotiation and the circumvention of the state, by its agents as well as 
by its users, attracting them on a common ground where the shared standards are different from those which are 
defined by the bureaucratic organizations” (Blundo 2006: 803). 
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ethnographic picture of a paichusuo reveals a thriving community center, inhabited primarily 
by a class of people police refer to as “the locals” (difang renshi or, more wryly, “the local 
gentry,” difang shenshi). As one patrolman glossed the category, “It’s the vocational 
participants in local affairs … people who are a bit more enthusiastic about participating in 
community affairs - the temple management committees, the village or borough chief, the 
village secretary, the popular representatives, the ones who are routinely active in the 
locality. ... There are even some with no formal status at all [who just] like to participate in 
‘backstage work’ ... you know, the advisors and the vote brokers.” 
 Administrative brokerage features prominently in the history of modern Chinese 
government. Prasenjit Duara’s (1985) study of early Republican state formation, for example, 
found it characterized by “a variation of the state-making process wherein the formal 
structures of the state grow simultaneously with informal structures … the formal state is 
dependent upon the informal structures to carry out many of its functions [yet] it is unable to 
extend its control over the latter” (Duara 1985: 132). And Phillip Huang (1993) has identified 
the formal-informal dynamics of this “Third Realm” as the main thread of continuity linking 
the modern Chinese administration of justice to its pre-modern precedents. Space limitations 
here preclude extensive ethnographic description of the brokering practices I observed in 
Taiwanese paichusuo, but I have elsewhere published accounts of the processes of 
negotiation through which police and “locals” cooperated to produce such records as traffic 
citations and accident reports (Martin forthcoming a), photographic evidence of a cleared 
hawker market (Martin 2007), and even the preliminary arrest report for a human trafficking 
case (Martin forthcoming b). In each case, an externally imposed demand for penal sanction 
temporarily destabilized the homeostatic equilibrium of networked accountability established 
within the architecture of local hukou registration. The real work of paichusuo policing, in 
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other words, is maintaining the equilibrium of this local order, most especially against 
extrinsic demands for penal intervention.  
 This local order is defined by particularistic virtues. Police work, seen from 
ethnographic perspective, is discursive work (Manning 1977). In Taiwan, the discourse is 
structured by the terms through which people establish and uphold their local reputation.  
Participation in the local community is founded on particularistic bonds of ganqing 
“sentiment,” spreading out into a web of guanxi (relationships), renqing (favors), mianzi 
(face), mingqi (fame), xinren (trust), guanxin (solicitude), limao (etiquette), yiqi 
(righteousness), de (virtue), ling (efficacy), and bao (reciprocity). This is a very specific, 
historically defined constellation of values. It is a system of ideas integrated by a structural 
logic into a robust cultural syndrome, a “particularistic” or “relational” cosmology of human 
association (Fei 1992). The local order kept by neighborhood police is defined by this 
cosmology, a civic ethos embodying the kind of moral character that motivates a friend of a 
friend to deliver a traffic citation. 
 
3. Policeable Virtues and the Role of Law. 
What does the ethnographic sketch presented above suggest for a broader 
understanding of policing, be it in terms of Asia or some sort of “Global South”? I will 
approach this issue here by juxtaposing two different theoretical frames. Each locates 
Taiwan’s policing vernacular in a slightly different interpretive context. The contrast between 
them, then, suggests both the scope and the limits of Taiwan’s significance for comparative 
policing studies. The first frame is Partha Chatterjee’s (2004) postcolonial theory of 
democracy as the “politics of the governed.” Certain aspects of Taiwanese policing resonate 
strongly with Chatterjee’s description of India, suggesting that my ethnography does indeed 
speak to dynamics of wider significance. The limits of this generality, however, are revealed 
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by the second moment of analysis where I juxtapose my findings against an account of 
policing in South Africa. Like Taiwan, South Africa is an “emergent democracy in which 
there is a plurality of policing providers” (Marks and Wood 2010: 311). Yet the South 
African response to the challenges of policing a post-authoritarian society involves a turn to 
law that diverges categorically from Taiwan’s virtue-focused, registry-based system. The 
difference between South African and Taiwanese democratic policing suggests some of the 
difficulties involved in making generalizations about policing in post-authoritarian or post-
colonial states, let alone any so-called “Global South.” 
Chatterjee’s theory of post-colonial democracy focuses on the tension between 
governmentality and citizenship. In places – like India, Taiwan and South Africa – where 
colonization made people objects of policy long before decolonization opened the arena of 
citizenship, popular politics remains rooted in collective habits incubated within colonial 
arrangements of security and welfare governance. This establishes a form of “political 
society” which differs in various ways from the rights-focused bourgeois associational forms 
of “civil society.” When decolonization finally opens democratic processes to the masses, the 
mode of democratic practice that unfolds from the established political society scandalize the 
civic sensibilities of the bourgeois elite, appearing as if “politics has been taken over by mobs 
and criminals” (Chatterjee 2004: 47). Such perceptions are well-documented in Taiwan (Chin 
2003). And Chen Kuan-Hsing (2010) has used Chatterjee’s theory to unpack the cultural 
content of Taiwan’s contemporary “political society” in detail, finding the particularistic 
virtues of ganqing-based solidarity described above at its core. 
Taiwan’s registry-based policing system is exemplary of Chatterjee’s depiction of 
colonial governmentality. The Japanese inaugurated it as an apparatus of counterinsurgency 
which securitized the social fabric through a system of collective responsibility for good 
behavior (Ts’ai 2009). Throughout the Japanese colonial and Chinese authoritarian period, it 
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functioned as a mechanism of political surveillance designed to foreclose possibilities of 
organized resistance by imposing patterns of collective vulnerability and risk onto local 
communities. When democratic reform transferred control over police budgets and personnel 
decisions to local representative councils in the 1990s, the underlying administrative 
organization of policing through the territorially defined population registry did not change, 
even as the hukou’s erstwhile function as a mechanism for centralized control was replaced 
by its new role as an arena for cultivating parochial democratic solidarities (Martin 
forthcoming b). In other words, democratic regime change preserved the established 
policeability of ganqing-based “traditional” virtues. They were hard-wired into in the local-
level patterns of mutual vulnerability and dependence that underwrite the discourse of moral 
standards which rationalizes the “natural” order of Taiwan’s policed society (cf. Silver 1967). 
 The hukou remains the primary form of representation used by the Taiwanese state to 
account for its population. However, my ethnographic description above shows that the work 
of maintaining these records is embedded in a field of “tactical government” (Feldman 2008). 
The negotiated qualities of Taiwanese street policing use formal record-keeping as a resource 
for maintaining local networks of substantive trust. And this makes the aggregate picture of 
a-people-in-police created by the hukou system factually inaccurate. Taiwan’s police registry, 
in other words, creates a sort of panoptical illusion possessing minimal qualities of 
“legibility” (Scott 1999). Taiwan’s policing vernacular explicitly subordinates the utility of 
factual veracity to the values of traditional virtue. These virtues are embodied in the 
horizontal solidarities of trust and cooperation mobilized around collective projects of 
keeping the state’s records in order. Taiwanese policing thereby serves to maintain a social 
order rationalized in terms of particularistic virtue. 
To understand that this conspiratorial, duplicitous, extra-legal arrangement is not a 
pathology but rather a functional system of modern policing, consider Nils Christie’s (2004) 
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distinction between horizontal and vertical justice. For Christie, horizontal justice is justice 
negotiated among stakeholders; it is intimate, situational and community-based. Vertical 
justice, by contrast, is that imposed by external authority through formal legal institutions. 
Both kinds have their appropriate place. But for the routine adjudication of minor problems, 
Christie argues, the locally anchored, locally relevant, restorative qualities of horizontal 
justice are preferable. Taiwanese policing clearly embodies this order of priority. Indeed, the 
formal aspects of Taiwanese policing - the bureaucratic records which constitute the 
“vertical” dimension of state hierarchy (cf. Ferguson and Gupta 2002) - are used in practice 
as a site in which to cultivate community-based “definitions of the situation.” The institution 
of the police registry constitutes a particular kind of juncture between the horizontal and 
vertical – or particularistic and general – dimensions in the administration of justice. 
Contemporary Taiwanese policing is, in other words, a mechanism for realizing the 
classically Confucian ideal of “governance through virtue”; the registry is a device for 
making, ganqing-based virtues policeable. 
Policeable virtue provides an alternative to law as the foundation of police 
governance. It is a form of policing suited to Chatterjee’s “political society.” In Taiwan 
traditional virtue has become a policeable object, in the sense described by Gilberto Rosas’ 
(2006) work on “policeability” in the borderlands. Non-citizens, holding no legal rights, are 
pure objects of governmentality. Yet wherever illegal immigration provides cheap docile 
labor, undocumented laborers are a core element of the socioeconomic status quo. 
“Undocumented migration is not a vector of social exclusion,” wrote DeGenova (2002), “but 
rather is constituted to socially include people under conditions of enforced and protracted 
vulnerability” (DeGenova 2002: 429). It is a highly organized regime of subaltern inclusion. 
The mechanisms of its organization are the arrangements of documentary practice: who holds 
whose papers, who vouches, who guarantees, etc. The arrangements of registry sharing are, 
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in Chatterjee’s terms, a sphere of political society. And different arrangements entail specific 
social effects. The documentary practices of police status weave a social fabric of 
vulnerability and risk that renders particular social objects susceptible to fine-grained 
management through the application of police force i.e. “policeable.” In Rosas’ work on the 
Mexican-American borderlands, policeable objects are things like ethnicity, gender, class and 
family status. Taiwanese policeability, by contrast, has replaced the crude “unintended” 
dynamics of undocumented migration with the historical wisdom of a political tradition in 
which sovereignty was originally conceived in terms of cultural inscription (Fei 1992). From 
its inception, the police registry has been consciously designed to function as a mechanism of 
inscription that improves the quality of the population by rendering civic virtue into a 
policeable object. 
This is a culturally and historically particular dynamic. Consider, in this respect, the 
contrast between Taiwan and South Africa for what it reveals about the imagined place of 
law within the organization of police. Chatterjee’s approach to civil society, as a distinctively 
bourgeois institution, emphasizes a central insight of critical legal studies: it is an ideological 
move to conflate the “natural order” of a community with the content of its criminal law 
(Balbus 1977). In Taiwan, the institutionalized policeability of virtue allows law to remain a 
marginal element in the imagination of social order (Winn 1994). Not so in South Africa. To 
be sure, Marks & Wood describe South Africa’s policing predicament in terms similar to 
Taiwan, a “nodal and fluid policing landscape” deploying a brokered system of social control 
to diffuse policing practices across a range of actors (Marks and Wood 2010: 312). Unlike 
Taiwan, however, South African social control is violent and unstable, raising urgent 
normative questions of “Who the police should be?” Marks and Wood’s proposed answer 
seeks to “[draw] a clear and robust blue line that distinguishes between the authority and 
capabilities of the public police and that of other policing actors” (Marks and Wood 2010: 
2012/12/01 
12 
320). And, for reasons elaborated at length in their article, law is center of this line; as they 
put it (quoting Reiner) “police intervention should be confined to cases where there is clear 
evidence of law-breaking, and should take the form of the invocation of legal powers and 
criminal process” (Marks and Wood 2012: 321). In Taiwan, by contrast, the invocation of 
legal powers and criminal process marks the collapse of the particularistic trust that holds 
together the peaceful and prosperous – if extra-legal – arrangements of local policed order. 
The historically derived, culturally structured arrangements of Taiwanese modernity endow it 
with a policing capacity that is clearly different from other places with other histories and 
cultures. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001) suggested we best understand the state through 
attention to its ethnographically apparent effects, such as the way it produces individualized 
subjects in a field of collective subjectivity. Taiwan’s hukou-based policing system produces 
subjects and solidarities in reference to a policeable set of traditional virtues. This 
exemplifies the distinctively Asian “historical ontology” Chen Kuan-Hsing (2010) found at 
the basis of the contemporary Taiwanese state. Like Chen, my analysis has revealed the 
institutional forms of so-called “Western” modernity to be “fragments internal to the local,” 
focusing on historical process of hybridization that produce a modernity that is “not what we 
imagined at the initial moment of translation at all, but a localized product of the blending 
process. It is something new” (Chen 2010: 244). The tropes of civil virtue that have taken 
shape as the organizing principles of Taiwanese policing are recognizably traditional, but at 
the same time they have become “something new.” They have become policeable objects of 
modern administration: inscribed in the documentary practices of population registration, 
embedded in a naturalized division of social control labor, and institutionalized as collective 
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habits of response to trouble. Seen in the light of anthropological analysis, Taiwanese 
policing reveals how a culturally ordered gestalt can be preserved as foundation for an 
authentically vernacular practice of modern government. What this means for larger concerns 
about “Asian,” “post-colonial,” or “post-authoritarian” policing will eventually become clear 
through comparative work like that organized through this issue of Theoretical Criminology.  
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